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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GARY WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DARRELL L. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case 
No. 8818 
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court arising out of an accident that 
happened on November 3, 1956 approximately one mile north 
of Paris, Idaho on U. S. Highway 89. The plaintiff was a non-
paying guest passenger in the car of the defendant. The court 
denied a motion for a new trial and this appeal is taken from 
the denial of said motion. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident from which this action arises occurred about 
four o'clock p.m. on November 3, 1956. Defendant and 
plaintiff had been acquainted for some time prior to the date 
of the accident, but had not seen each other for a considerable 
period of time. They met in Montpelier, Idaho by accident 
at about noon on the day of the accident. After some conver-
sation they decided to go for a ride in defendant's automobile, 
upon which certain mechanical work had just been completed 
at the Bear River Motor Garage. After riding around for a 
short time in Montpelier they drove east on Highway 30 North 
to Border, Wyoming. The road between Montpelier and Border 
is rather winding and somewhat mountainous and is generally 
a more difficult road to drive than U. S. Highway 89 traveling 
south from Montpelier upon which the accident occurred. 
Plaintiff traveled at a speed between 50 and 55 miles per 
hour en route to Border and returning to Montpelier from 
Border. 
When plaintiff and defendant returned to Montpelier 
they stopped and picked up Miss Karen Wright, a girl friend 
of defendant, and started out for another ride in a Southerl} 
direction on U. S. Highway 89. After they had left Montpelier 
and traveled a short distance defendant increased the speed 
of the automobile to approximately 70 miles per hour. Plaintiff 
made no protest at this speed nor to the manner in which 
defendant was driving. The passenger, Karen Wright, protested 
but stated that she had made a protest not because she was 
concerned about defendant's driving, but because she just 
did not like to go fast. At the town of Ovid, which is approxi-
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mately five miles from Montpelier, defendant allowed the 
right wheels of the automobile to go slightly onto the gravel 
shoulder in the course of negotiating a 90 degree curve in the 
town. However, at that point there is a broad level gravel area 
at the outside of the curve with no obstructions. The parties 
then proceeded on south on Highway 89 toward Paris, Idaho 
at about the same speed of 70 miles per hour. 
During the entire afternoon the weather was clear and 
visibility was good. At the point where the accident occurred, 
about one mile north of Paris, Idaho, the highway is paved, 
generally level and straight. The road surface is about 19 feet 
in width with generally level gravel shoulders of approximately 
6 to 8 feet in width. The speed limit at the point of accident 
was 60 miles per hour. Traffic was light. Commencing at a 
point just south of the point where the impact took place 
there is a double yellow no-passing line on the highway and 
about one quarter of a mile to the south there is the crest of 
a knoll which obstructs vision beyond that point to the south. 
The only person who actually saw the accident occur is the 
passenger, Karen Wright. Her testimony, supported generally 
by the other evidence adduced is that a farm tractor pulled 
onto the highway from a side road leading into the highway 
from a field to the defendant's right or to the west of the 
highway. The tractor proceeded onto the highway making a 
wide turn to go south, in the course of the turn crossing over 
the center line onto the northbound portion of the highway. 
The large hay wagon followed the path of the tractor and thus 
in the course of entering the highway the tractor and hay 
wagon generally obstructed both lanes of travel on the high-
way. Defendant apparently observed the hay wagon as it was 
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obstructing the highway and in some pos1t1on astraddle the 
center line of the highway attempted to pass to the right of 
the tractor and wagon. He failed to do so and collided with 
the right rear corner and right side of the hay wagon and 
with the right rear wheel of the tractor. After the collision 
the car went off into the barrow pit and rolled over. 
Plaintiff was thrown from the automobile into a barbwire 
fence and the injury and damage to his leg resulted. Defendant 
was pinned under the car and was rendered unconscious. 
Plaintiff has no clear recollection of the accident itself. De-
fendant has no recollection of any events prior to the return 
of plaintiff and defendant to Montpelier. Both at the time 
when Karen Wright observed the hay wagon and tractor prior 
to the collision and at the time of collision the hay wagon was 
straddling the center line or was prortuding to the east of 
the center line and was effectively obstructing both lanes of 
travel on the highway. 
Other than the protest by Karen Wright on the basis 
described above and the incident at the turn in Ovid, plaintiff 
and Karen Wright conceded that defendant's driving was 
alright, that they were not concerned and that he seemed to 
be operating his automobile in a prudent and efficient manner. 
There had been no other unusual incidents from the time the 
parties left Montpelier to the time when the accident occurred. 
At the point where the collision occurred, the right wheels 
of defendant's automobile were about one foot off of the 
oil on the west shoulder of the road. The left wheels were 
on the paved portion of the highway. The terrain w~ts such 
that the level of the fields to the west of the highway was 
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below the level of the highway and the farm tractor and hay 
wagon came up a slight rise in the entry road as they entered 
onto the highway. The barrow pit at the side of the road to 
the west into which defendant's automobile rolled after the 
collision was also below the level of the surface of the highway. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MIS-
TRIAL BECAUSE OF PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS MADE 
BY COUNSEL IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT END OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, AND MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT NAMING THE VET-
ERANS' ADMINISTRATION A PARTY PLAINTIFF AS 
, !'HE VETERANS' ADlvfiNISTRA TION WAS A REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST. 
7 
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• 
POINT V 
ERROR IN LAW TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE ASSIGN-
MENT OF A PERSONAL INJURY TO THE VETERANS' 
ADMINISTRATION AND TO ALLOW EVIDENCE RE-
LATING TO A HOSPITAL BILL AT THE VETERANS' 
ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL. 
POINT VI 
THE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE AND WERE IN-
FLUENCED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS 
SUBMISSION OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION 
HOSPITAL BILL. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF ALVIN W. FOLGER AND DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THIS TESTI-
MONY. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GlVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS r\ N l) iT'\ ll\1-
PROPERL Y INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff was a non-paying guest passenger 
in the automobile of defendant, the plaintiff was obligated to 
meet the requirements of Section 49-1001, Idaho Code, which 
reads as follows: 
"No person transported by the owner or operator 
of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for 
such transportation shall have a cause for damages 
against such owner or operator for death or loss, in 
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been 
intentional on the part of said owner or operator or 
caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard 
of the rights of others." 
The complaint of the plaintiff contains no allegation, and 
there was no proof that the accident was intentional or caused 
by the intoxication of the host and therefore the only portion 
of the statute that concerns us here is whether or not the con-
duct of the defendant amounted to "reckless disregard of the 
rights of others." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined the term "reckless 
disregard for the rights of others" on many occasions. In the 
case of Foberg v. Harrison, 71 Ida. 11, 225 Pac. 2d 69, ( 1950), 
the court stated as follows: 
"The term 'reckless disregard' as used in said section 
( 49-1001, Idaho Code supra) means an act or conduct 
destitute of heed or concern for consequences; espe-
9 
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cially foolishly heedless of danger, headlong rash; 
wanton disregard, or conscious indifference to conse-
quences." 
In a later case, Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 253 P. 
2d 240, 243 ( 195 3), the Idaho Supreme Court stated as fol-
lows in referring to the foregoing statement: 
"This implies a consciousness of danger and a will-
ingness to assume the risk, or an indifference to con-
sequences." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Also see the following cases: 
Hudson v. Decker, ____ Utah ____ , 317 P. 2d 594, 1957; 
Grant v. Clarke, ____ Idaho ____ , 305 P. 2d 752, 1956; 
Wilson v. Bacon, ____ Idaho ____ , 304 P. 2d 908, 1956; 
Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P. 2d 608, 1955. 
The case of Mason v. Mootz, supra, further states at 
page 243 as follows: 
"In a guest case the burden is on the plaintiff to 
prove that the accident was caused by conduct on the 
part of the defendant amounting to reckless disregard 
as so defined. Proof of ordinary negligence will not 
suffice." (Many cases cited therein.) 
There is absolutely no evidence from the facts in this case 
that the defendant showed a reckless disregard for the safety 
of others or that he was conscious of any danger and was will-
ing to assume the risk with an indifference to the consequences. 
The facts in this case are that the plaintiff, defendant and Karen 
Wright were out for a ride on a straight, dry, lightly traveled 
arterial highway in the afternoon of November ), 1956. A 
tractor pulling a large hay wagon entered the highway and 
10 
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was going at a very slow speed when the defendant's car 
struck it on the right rear side. The defendant does not re-
member the details of the accident (R. 220). 
The plaintiff does not remember what happened prior 
to the accident and thereafter as he was looking for some sun 
glasses and did not see the tractor and large hay wagon in 
the highway (R. 131, 132). 
The plaintiff and defendant had taken a drive to Border, 
Wyoming prior to the accident and nothing was unusual about 
the way the car was driven between Montpelier, Idaho, and 
Border, Wyoming (R. 126). The plaintiff further stated that 
he at no time made any objections to the way in which the 
defendant was driving the car from the time they left Mont-
pelier to the scene of the accident (R. 155, 156). 
Miss Karen Wright's testimony places the large hay wagon 
at an angle and across the center line and certainly she is the 
only person who saw the tractor and hay wagon prior to the 
accident. Her testimony (R. 118) is to the effect that the 
tractor and hay wagon had to make a wide swing on the high-
way and was not going straight down the road on its own side 
at the time of the accident. 
Further the testimony is that the blacktopped surface is 
19 feet wide (R. 46) and the hay wagon and load of hay was 
10 feet 2 inches (R. 59) so it follows that part of the obstruc-
tion on the highway was over the center line, and that both 
lanes of the highway were at least partially obstructed at this 
time. 
It is obvious that the defendant under these circumstances 
11 
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did what he thought best at the time he was confronted with 
the obstacle in his path, and made reasonable efforts under 
the circumstances to avoid a collision. The plaintiff cannot 
recover from this defendant unless he can prove the proximate 
cause of the accident was defendant's heedless and reckless 
disregard for the lives of others. This he has failed to do. Mere 
negligence of the defendant is not sufficient to recover damages. 
A recent Idaho case that has an analagous situation to 
the case at hand is Turner v. Purdum, supra. 
In the Turner case Purdum was driving a Hudson auto-
mobile and Turner, the plaintiff, was riding with him. They 
were traveling at about 45-50 miles per hour. It was windy, 
with some dust and occasionally a sprinkle of rain and was 
dark. 
Turner was resting m the front seat with Purdum and 
remembers nothing of the accident. 
One Malden Dye, at the same time, was driving a farm 
tractor in the same direction as Purdum and was towing a 
two-way, two-row potato digger. The tractor was equipped 
with a white light, 4Y2 inches in diameter, fastened under the 
seat of the tractor. The light illuminated the digger and road 
to the rear. Purdum saw the white light about one-half mile 
away and did not see it again until he was within 25-30 feet 
of the digger and it was too late then to do anything. The 
Hudson crashed into the digger and Turner was injured. 
(The testimony in the present case is that the appellant 
was not going faster than 70 miles per hour and the condition 
of the road and the terrain are stated above.) 
12 
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The court said in the Turner case as follows: 
"Appellant fails to point out any act or acts of 
negligence or combination of such acts by respondent 
Purdum which appellant considers as constituting 
reckless disregard. The evidence does not disclose that 
respondent Purdum was driving at a rate of speed 
which could constitute more than ordinary negligence 
under the circumstances. His failure to see the potato 
digger in time to avoid the accident could not be more 
than ordinary negligence. There is nothing in the record 
to indicate that respondent Purdom was or should have 
been conscious of danger and to indicate a willingness 
on his part to assume the risk, or an indifference to 
consequences." 
It is to be noted that exactly the same elements of possible 
negligence exist in the Turner case as in the instant case. These 
are: (a) speed which may be excessive or unsafe under the 
conditions then and there existing and (b) improper lookout 
or momentary inattention. There is absolutely no evidence of 
any other wrongful or negligent acts on the part of defendant. 
Further, defendant was confronted with a more difficult situ-
ation by reason of the wide turn of the tractor and hay wagon 
and the resulting obstruction of both sides of the highway, 
than was Purdum. 
The state of New Mexico has exactly the same guest statute 
as Idaho and the court of New Mexico in a recent case, Smith 
v. Meadows, ____ N.M. ____ , 242 P. 2d 1006, (1952) held that 
speed itself does not justify a conclusion that the accident 
was caused by defendant's heedless and reckless disregard for 
others. 
The facts in the Smith case, supra, were that the plaintiff 
l) 
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was riding as a guest in the defendant's car when it collided 
with the car of a third person, Gomez. Gomez had parked 
his car on the side of the road, without lights, due to the fact 
the motor was heating up. The testimony is to the effect that 
the defendant was traveling between 70 and 80 miles per hour 
at night. 
The court on page 1011 states the very purpose of the 
guest statute is to prevent recovery by a guest of damages 
resulting from the negligence of a driver and allows recovery 
only in case the driver's acts were intentional or in heedless 
disregard of the rights of others. 
The facts in the instant case at most would support a find-
ing only of simple negligence as to the elements of speed and 
lookout, and consequently the plaintiff has failed to meet the 
burden imposed upon him by statute. The evidence does not 
show a reckless disregard for the lives of others. The defend-
ant's conduct was such that he did all he could to avoid the 
tractor that was obstructing the highway and certainly this does 
not warrant a finding of reckless disregard for others. A careful 
distinction should be drawn between neg1igence of a driver 
and heedless and reckless disregard on the part of a driver 
for the rights and safety of others. 
The difference between reckless misconduct and negli-
gence is well stated in Wilson v. Bacon, supra, p. 909, as fol-
lows: 
"Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in 
several important particulars. It differs from that form 
of negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, in-
competence, unskillfulness or a failure to take pre-
cautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a 
14 
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possible or probable future emergency in that reckless 
misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course 
of action either with knowledge of the serious danger 
to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts 
which would disclose this danger to any reasonable 
man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned 
form of negligence, but also from that negligence which 
consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge 
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the 
actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct 
involves a risk substantially greater in amount than 
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
The difference between reckless misconduct and con-
duct involving only such a quantum of risk as is neces-
sary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree 
of the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked 
as to amount substantially to a difference in kind." 2 
Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 500g." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Turner v. Purdum case is directly in point and should 
be followed in this case. The evidence does not show a con-
sciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or 
an indifference to consequences. Clearly this must be found 
before the defendant can be guilty of reckless disregard. 
Momentary inattention will not support a recovery 111 a 
guest case. The state of Connecticut has the same guest statute 
as does New Mexico, and it has been consistently held that 
conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, 
or from error of judgment does not indicate a reckless disregard 
of the rights of others. 
See: 
Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 3 71, 3 76, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 
943; 
15 
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Coner v. Chittenden, 116 Conn. 78, 82, 163 A. 472; 
Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P. 732, 120 A.L.R. 
1507. 
In the case of Winn v. Ferguson, ____ Calif. ____ , 282 P. 
2d 515, at page 516, the court states: 
" . . . A .finding of wilful misconduct cannot be 
predicated upon mere inadvertence or even gross negli-
gence." 
Our own Supreme Court in the case of Hudson v. Decker, 
supra, p. 596, in holding the evidence insufficient to support 
a contention of "reckless disregard" in construing the Idaho 
guest statute stated: 
"To permit a jury to infer from the mere fact that 
defendant's car left the road under the circumstances 
disclosed, (car left the road on a curve) that the 
defendant was driving with knowledge of danger and 
with conscious indifference to consequences, would be 
to invite them to infer, not merely negligence, but 
'reckless disregard of the rights of others,' from the 
mere fact that an accident happened and someone was 
thereby injured. To so hold would, in effect, cast the 
burden of showing freedom from 'reckless disregard' 
upon the defendant." 
In summary as to this point the defendant's speed will 
not sustain a finding of "heedless and reckless disregard of 
the rights of others" nor will the mere monetary inattention 
or improper lookout of the defendant justify such a finding 
based on the law cited herein. 
16 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MIS-
TRIAL BECAUSE OF PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS MADE 
BY COUNSEL IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. 
A supplemental transcript of the arguments for a mistrial 
on the basis of the statements made by counsel is submitted 
to the court for its consideration. 
Counsel for plaintiff said during his opening statement 
that the plaintiff and defendant had stopped and purchased 
a sixpack carton of beer. A proper objection was made and 
argument was then heard ( S. R. 1) . Counsel for defendant 
set forth the reasons for said motion and they are found on 
page three of the supplemental record. 
Defendant contends that it was clearly error and as such 
the trial judge should have granted a mistrial. The jury had 
heard the statement and the defendant's position was prejudiced 
by such statement and said objection was raised at the time 
of trial (S.R. 5). The admonition of the trial judge (S.R. 7) 
does not and did not correct the prejudicial effect of said 
statement. 
In the case of McCarthy vs. Spring Valley Coal Company, 
232 Ill. 473, 83 N.E. 957, (1908), where the attorney for the 
plaintiff interjected the fact that the plaintiff had a wife and 
five children the court said: 
"The statement to the jury that the appellant had a 
wife and five children was manifestly improper. Its 
only object could have been to enhance the damages 
by getting before the jury, in this improper and un-
professional manner, facts calculated to arouse the 
17 
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sympathy which counsel know could not in any legiti-
mate way be brought to their attention. To admit 
evidence of such fact is error ... The fact once lodged 
in the minds of the jury could not be erased by an 
instruction and appellee by this statement secured the 
benefit of the fact to the same extent as if he had intro-
duced evidence to prove it ... It is impossible to tell 
the effect on the verdict of the impression wrongfully 
conveyed to the jury's mind by the improper conduct 
of counsel." 
A good statement of the general law is found in American 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 53, page 358, Section 456, reference to 
inadmissible evidence. It is generally held that statements by 
counsel that certain evidence will be introduced are not im-
proper if made in good faith and with reasonable ground to 
believe the evidence is admissible, even though the intended 
proof referred to is afterwards excluded. However, in the 
absence of good faith, or where prejudice is clearly produced, 
whether as a result of accident, inadvertence, or misconception, 
the rule is to the contrary. 
In Vol. 39, American Jurisprudence, page 71, Section 
53, New Trial, we find the following statement: 
"Misconduct of counsel for one party, if of such a 
nature as to influence a verdict in favor of that party, or 
to prevent the adverse party from having a fair trial is, 
if proper and timely objection thereto is made, grounds 
for a new trial. Such objectionable conduct may con-
sist in improper remarks, comments, or arguments, 
willfully and intentionally offering inadmissable evi-
dence or propounding improper questions to witnesses, 
making uncalled for abuse of witnesses, and other such 
acts of misconduct calculated to influence or prejudice 
the jury. Where there is any misconduct on the part 
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of counsel for the prevailing party which appears to 
have been liable, even though not intended to have 
a pernicious effect upon legal proceedings, or a pre-
vailing influence on the jury, there is reason for treating 
the trial as a mis-trial and directing that the judgment 
be set aside." 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court should have 
granted defendant's motion for a mis-trial as it is absolutely 
impossible to determine whether or not the jury considered 
such improper statement of counsel, and the statement was 
of such a nature that reasonable minds could only conclude it 
would have a prejudicial effect upon the jury. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT END OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, AND MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Counsel for defendant made a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's Complaint (R. 217) and the grounds are set forth 
in the record. It was error for the court not to grant this motion 
based on the evidence that had been adduced. 
The law as to the points argued is set forth m other 
sections of the brief. 
Defendant's counsel renewed its motion again at the close 
of all the evidence (R. 226-227) and said motion was denied 
by the court. It was error for the court to let this matter go 
to the jury and not direct a verdict for the defendant. 
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A motion for a new trial was argued and the court denied 
said motion. Based on the law as stated above with reference 
to the remarks of counsel in his opening statement, the evi-
dence, the admissibility of testimony in error, and other errors 
treated in this brief, this motion should have been granted. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT NAMING THE VET-
ERANS' ADMINISTRATION A PARTY PLAINTIFF AS 
THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION WAS A REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST. 
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest." 
Counsel for defendant argued this matter to the Court 
(R. 122) and the Court stated that it would take the matter 
under advisement. Counsel for defendant (R. 217) made a 
motion that the Veterans' Administration be made a real party 
in interest based on the testimony of Mr. Monson. The court 
denied said motion. 
Based on the cross examination of Mr. Monson it is per-
fectly obvious that the Veterans' Administration is a real 
party in interest. They admit (R. 213) that a bill would not 
be sent to the plaintiff except for this lawsuit and they would 
not expect to be paid. They further state their only interest is 
that they will participate in the judgment if the plaintiff re-
covers. The services were rendered gratituitiously to the 
plaintiff and he had no obligation to pay. 
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If the court is going to allow the Veterans' Ad~inistration 
to participate in the proceeds from a judgment for plaintiff 
then the Veterans' Administration must be named as a party 
plaintiff as they are a real party in interest. 
It is stated in 39 American Jurisprudence, page 872, 
Section 17, at follows: 
" ... The term 'real party in interest' as used in 
such practice provisions, in terms which indicate that 
he must be the person to be benefited by, or entitled to 
receive the benefit of, the suit." 
Certainly the Veterans' Administration was in a position 
whereby it would benefit by the judgment if favorable to 
plaintiff but would have no interest whatsoever if plaintiff 
failed to receive a judgment. Hence they should have been 
made a part plaintiff. The jury was entitled to have this sub-
mitted to them in a proper manner. 
POINT V 
ERROR IN LAW TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE ASSIGN-
MENT OF A PERSONAL INJURY TO THE VETERANS' 
ADMINISTRATION AND TO ALLOW EVIDENCE RE-
LATING TO A HOSPITAL BILL AT THE VETERANS' 
ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL. 
It is a well settled rule that in the absence of a statute 
to the contrary a cause of action to recover for personal injuries 
IS not assignable. 
The court erred in allowing Exhibit "G" in evidence, which 
i$ the bill in the amount of $3,300.75 for treatment of plaintiff 
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at the Veterans' Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The Court further erred in allowing testimony and 
evidence relating to any charge for such treatment. 
The evidence is clear (R. 215) that an assignment was 
executed by the plaintiff on the fifth day of September, 1957 
(Exhibit H) and that another assignment was made on the 
tenth day of December, 1957 (Exhibit I). The testimony of 
William S. Monson (R. 218 et seq.) related solely to the 
treatment of plaintiff at the Veterans' Administration Hospital 
in Salt Lake City, Utah and the charges therefor. 
A recent annotation holding that a personal injury claim 
is not assignable unless stautory authorization exists is found 
in 40 A.L.R. 2d 501. Many cases are cited therein establishing 
the rule as stated above. These cases are from jurisdictions 
all over the United States. There is a Utah case directly on 
this point in In re Behm's Estate, 213 P. 2d 657, which follows 
the said rule. This case distinguishes between the assignment 
of a cause of action for personal injury and the assignment 
of the proceeds of a judgment rendered in such a case. At 
pages 662-663 the cour states as follows: 
"In the first cited case, the injured person assigned 
to a hospital a share of any proceeds he should acquire 
from any settlement or judgment to be paid by the 
tort-feasor. The court recognized that under the law 
of the state of New York the cause of action was 
non-assignable, but held that the assignment of a 
share of the proceeds was enforceable in equity." 
"To rule that I cannot assign the cause of action, 
but that I can transfer 100 per cent of its proceeds 
sounds anomalous. It is tantamount to saying that I 
can transfer the substance but retain the shell; that 
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I can give you the right to the recovery, but I must 
hold the right to recover. However, repeated prece-
dents of many years' standing tell us this is the law." 
The evidence is clear that the plaintiff owed the Veterans' 
Administration nothing until such time as he secured a judg-
ment against defendant and that then by virtue of the assign-
ment which he gratuitiously executed several months after 
the conclusion of his treatment at the Veterans' Administration 
Hospital (R. 143), he had an obligation to pay them from 
the proceeds of the judgment. Thus the hospital bill and the 
assignment were completely irrelevant and immaterial as to 
this case and were not properly an item of damages to be 
considered by the jury. 
The court further erred in instruction number seven by 
informing the jury that if the plaintiff should recover a judg-
ment he would be obligated to pay to the Veterans' Admin-
istration the sum of $3,300.75 from the proceeds thereof. 
POINT VI 
THE DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE AND WERE IN-
FLUENCED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS 
SUBMISSION OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION 
HOSPITAL BILL. 
The damages awarded the plaintiff are excessive and were 
materially affected by the court's error in instructing the jury 
with reference to the hospital bill of the Veterans' Adminis-
tration. 
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The defendant sets forth the following grounds as error 
in admitting the testimony of Mr. Monson and the Veterans' 
Administration records (R. 214-215): 
1. The charge results only from illegal, improper and 
invalid assignment of a personal injury action in tort; 
2. It is not a proper item of damages, either special or 
general; 
3. It results from a voluntary assignment executed in 
September of 19 57, after the services of the Veterans Ad-
ministration Hospital to plaintiff had been completed; 
4. The services were rendered gratuitously, and the Vet· 
erans Administration has no right to recover except on the 
basis of the previously-mentioned assignment, which, if valid, 
is an assignment only of any recovery which plaintiff might 
secure tn this action. Otherwise, plaintiff has no obligation 
to pay; 
5. The bill has not been paid, nor is it payable except 
from proceeds from any judgment which plaintiff might secure 
in this action. 
6. There was no evidence that the charges were reason-
able. 
In further support of the defendant's position, cites 40 
A.L.R. 2nd, 500, and particularly the portions in Section 2 
on page 501. and Section 3 on page 502; and In Re Behm's 
Estate, 21 _) Pacific 2nd 65 7.) 
It is perfectly obvious that the verdict was inHuenced by 
the admission of this evidence and the jury should not have 
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been instructed as to the claim of the Veterans Administration 
Hospital. The damages were not properly submitted to the 
jury and as such the verdict is excessive. The defendant's 
position was prejudiced thereby. 
Although the case should not have been submitted to the 
jury, when it was submitted the Veterans Administration 
Hospital bill had no place in the considerations of the jury. 
It is only reasonable to conclude that the amount awarded 
to plaintiff was materailly affected by this evidence and the 
instructions thereon, and very likely to an extent greater than 
the amount of the bill itself. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF ALVIN W. FOLGER AND DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THIS TESTI-
MONY. 
The plaintiff called as a witness one Alvin W. Folger to 
testify as an expert witness as to stopping distances, reaction 
time, etc. The record fails to disclose any brake marks what-
soever and further there is no testimony as to the surface of 
the highway except that it was blacktop. 
Officer Folger testified (R. 165) as to the necessary ele-
ments of determining the stopping distance of an automobile. 
The hypothetical question put to the officer (R. 169) does 
not state the facts in the case as there was no testimony that 
the driver observed the danger, there were no brake or skid 
marks present before the impact, it does not appear at what 
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distance from the tractor and hay wagon the defendant was 
when he observed them, and the other necessary elements 
for the conclusions of the witness were not established by 
the evidence in the case. 
Counsel objected all the way through the officer's testi. 
mony and made a motion to strike (R. 171) said testimony 
as it did not relate to the facts in their entirety, contained 
improper conclusions, was a mere guess by the witness and 
was confusing to the jury. A further objection was made on 
the basis that the officer was not a qualified expert. The court 
should not have allowed the testimony and after it was ad· 
mitted it should have been stricken. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AND IN IM-
PROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
The court erred in not granting defendant's requested 
instruction number one. This instruction was to the effect that 
the evidence does not support a finding that defendant operated 
his vehicle in a manner to constitute reckless disregard of the 
rights of others. 
Defendant's instruction number two was to the effect 
that the plaintiff assumed the risk as to the manner in which 
defendant was operating the car. The facts clearly disclose 
that this should have been given as the plaintiff at no time 
protested to the defendant about his driving (R. 161). 
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Instruction number s1x as requested should have been 
given as it explains the difference between reckless misconduct 
and negligence. 
2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 500 g. 
Defendant's requested instruction number 10 should have 
been given as it stated that more than one act of simple negli-
gence on the part of a driver will not be combined to render 
the driver guilty of reckless disregard of the rights of others. 
Turner v. Purdum, supra. 
Counsel for defendant took exceptions to the instructions 
as given by the Court on page 245 and subsequent pages and by 
reference thereto these exceptions are incorporated in this 
brief. The defendant feels that said exceptions are with merit 
and respectfully asks the court to review said exceptions and 
their contents. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the court erred in submitting this case 
to the jury, that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to meet 
the burden of proving reckless disregard on the part of de-
fendant and that there was thus no legitimate question of fact 
to be decided by the jury. 
Further, that the court should have granted to defendant 
a dismissal with prejudice at the close of plaintiffs case and 
should have directed a verdict in favor of defendant at the 
conclusion of all of the evidence. 
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We further believe, without prejudice to the foregoing, 
that defendant is entitled to a new trial if this court should 
concur with the trial court with respect to the foregoing con-
tentions. We base this contention upon the other errors assigned 
in defendant and appellant's brief which were prejudicial to 
defendant and which made it impossible for defendant to 
have a fair trial by the jury or to have a verdict rendered 
based on proper evidence, argument and instructions as to 
the law. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment of 
the lower court should be reversed and judgment awarded to 
defendant dismissing planitiff' s complaint with prejudice and 
granting judgment for no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Carman E. Kipp 
SIMMONS, BEASLIN & NYGAARD 
John Beaslin 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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